

COMMUNICATIONS BR.
JCS-SIC PLAN

SECRET

ARMY SERVICES FORCES
Signal Security Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

21 August 1944

SPSIO - 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major John W. Delafield

SUBJECT: Use of Hagelin Machine for Secret Traffic

1. The method of using the Hagelin cryptographic machine as described in the inclosures, but with a maximum of 150 groups enciphered from one setting, instead of the 200 groups allowed in the instructions, is considered secure for secret traffic, with the following reservations.

(The reservations suggested are of a highly technical nature and will be made before any effort is made to use the machine for secret traffic. The above letter is on file in the Message Center and may be consulted if necessary. For security reasons it is considered inadvisable to have these purely technical matters bearing directly on the method of use on file in any other place.)

/s/ T. Preston Jordanman
T. PRESTON JORDANMAN
Colonel, Signal Corps

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum to Secretariat - September 25, 1944 - Page 2

On Monday, September 18, I discussed this matter with Colonel Collins, who is Executive Officer for Colonel Corderman. After explaining to him the situation, he said that so far as he could see there was nothing further that his office could do as they had expressed their opinion.

It seems to me that now the right of CDS to use the Hagelin machine for secret traffic is clear on the record. Under the early recommendations (for whatever force they may have) a relationship was set up with the Chief Signal Officer. We have found that the machines with which we were supplied are not efficient working machines. The Chief Signal Officer through the Chief, Signal Security Agency, which is the organization best qualified to handle these very matters has ruled that if used as indicated the machine is secure for such traffic.

John W. Dwyer
and Mr. Dwyer
 Chief, Signal Security Agency

1 Incl.

JWB:rbh

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: SECRETARIAT

DATE: September 25, 1944

FROM: MAJOR DELAFIELD

SUBJECT: Discussions concerning use of Hagelin Machines for Secret Traffic.

During October and November 1942 certain correspondence was exchanged between OSS, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and OPD concerning the nature of the cryptographic systems to be used by this organization.

Among the recommendations made at that time was one that the Chief Signal Officer furnish OSS with cryptographic machines to handle its Secret traffic. Such being the case OSS recommended that it agree to use the Hagelin machine, which it was then using, for such traffic. It was also recommended that the Chief Signal Officer supervise and cooperate with the OSS in the preparation of its systems and make available to OSS current technical advice and assistance.

In view of the relatively poor results obtained from the SIGBYC machine actually furnished us by the Army and the difficulty of obtaining parts, proper current, maintenance men, etc., a result which was not expected when we proposed to use such machinery--it was my feeling that OSS should return to the Hagelin machine, currently used only for confidential traffic, because of its greater flexibility and ease of use as well as of the lesser maintenance problem entailed. Accordingly, under date of August 12, 1944 we requested the Chief Signal Officer to rule on the security of the latter machine for secret traffic taking into consideration the methods of actual use prescribed by OSS.

By ruling dated 21 August 1944, the pertinent portions of which have been abstracted and are hereto attached, Colonel Corderman, Chief, Signal Security Agency, held that the machine as used was "considered secure for secret traffic" but with certain reservations of a technical nature which can be or are now being met.

After discussion with Major Lee, Chief OSS Secretariat, an appointment was arranged for me with Colonel Gridley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On Saturday, September 16, I showed him all papers including the ruling signed by Colonel Corderman and explained that in default of being able to use the better types of Army cryptographic machinery, which they refused to supply to us, I felt that in order to get on with handling our traffic efficiently it would be wise to use the Hagelin or at least to have the right to do so clear. The substance of Colonel Gridley's answer after some examination of the papers and discussion was that whatever Colonel Corderman decided to do was all right with him.

SECRET

OS Form 4351

Contract to destroy
DateTo: Subj

Please check 51 +
X-2, also Admin
Services to determine
whether they will
have any use for the
TKR to N.Y.C. after
July 1. We want to
close it out if not
necessary.

Office of the Executive Officer

(90449)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Secretariat
 FROM : Administrative Services
 SUBJECT: Telekryptom Machine in New York

DATE: 25 June 1945

1945 JUN 24 AM 6 30

1. Confirming telephone conversation with your
 Pvt. Gady on the above subject, this Branch has no
 objection to the discontinuance of said machine after
 1 July 1945.

For the Deputy Director:

L. G. Demgen
 L. G. Demgen
 Captain, AGD

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

26 June 1945

1945 JUN 26 PM 5 30

089

To: Chief, Secretariat
From: Administrative Officer, SI
Subject: Telecrypton Service to New York

In accordance with Mr. Cady's request, I have made a check in the SI Branch as to the desirability of continuing the telecrypton service to New York so far as SI Branch is concerned. I have contacted the various Divisional Deputies and Section Chiefs, and have been informed practically unanimously that the service is used only rarely, and it therefore is not essential.

C.F.
Charles E. Ford

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. M. E. McMahon
Chief, Procurement and Supply Branch

FROM: James J. Murphy
Chief, X-2 Branch

SUBJECT: Request for Termination of Contract No. 115 covering
Loose Teleprinter Circuit Between New York and Washington

1. It is requested that the above contract be terminated effective 1 July 1945.
2. Our inventory fails to disclose that any of the property referred to in this contract, or in connection with this audit, is charged to X-2 Branch. However, if a review of same by the Contracts Division of OSS should indicate that we do own any of said property, it is desired that same be considered surplus to our needs and made available to the Communications Branch in which event arrangements should be made to obtain a property release for X-2.
3. The terminals of this circuit are located in X-2 Offices in Room 2075a, Temporary Que Building, Washington, and Room 3601, International Building, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
4. We have assured the OSS Communications Branch through Major John W. Delafield that this circuit and equipment are available to them if they desire to avail themselves of same and remove it from the X-2 Offices at both terminals. If they wish to take possession of this property prior to the close of the fiscal year, that is agreeable to X-2 Branch.
5. I am not setting forth an inventory of the released equipment inasmuch as we do not have a copy of the above contract in our files. However, a copy of same is available in the Contracts Division.
6. We have checked the equipment and have been unable to locate any of the serial numbers. Nevertheless, it is our understanding that under date of 26 December 1942 OSS Contract No. 97, Purchase Order No. 2960, we purchased four (4) 2A Telecrypton machines and one (1) Special Reperforator table, which are presently in use as a part of this unit.

cc: Major John W. Delafield, Communications Branch
Lt. Charles A. Dane, USNR, Board of Review
Lt. J. B. Kelley, USNR, Contracts Division
Mr. A. Seymour Houghton, New York.

RESTRICTED

OS5 FORM 40014

Date

27 June 48

To:

Lt. Putzell

Herewith memoranda from
X-2, SI, and Administrative
Services indicating those Branches
no longer have any use for the
telecrypton circuit to New York.
Evidently, there is no justifi-
cation for the continuance of
this service.

HSC
Pvt. H. S. Cady

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

Office Memorandum

RESTRICTED
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Shannon
 FROM : Executive Office
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 14 June 1964

It is ~~recommended~~ ^{recommended} that the teletype circuit to New York be cancelled immediately.

The branches which heretofore have had use for this circuit indicate that there is no further need for it.

approved
 Charles S. Chubb
 asst. Dir.

EXP
 LJP

RESTRICTED

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lieutenant Pittrell
FROM : Secretariat
SUBJECT: Telecrypton Service to New York

The Contracts Division reports that the telecrypton circuit to New York was cancelled as of 30 June 1945. The Communications Branch took over all those pieces of equipment which are impossible to obtain elsewhere and which would be useful in connection with future operations.

[Signature]
H.S.C.

md

(x 1 D)

RESTRICTED

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-20-K-mr
Serial 3519320

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

4 OCT 1944

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Director, Office of Strategic Services
Subj: U. S. Navy Radio Monitor Station, Reseda, California

1. It is planned to move the U. S. Navy Radio Monitor Station, Reseda, Calif., to the U. S. Navy Radio Station, Pt. Loma, Calif., shortly after 1 October 1944. This transfer is occasioned by the desire to integrate the subject monitoring activity more closely with that of a large Navy Communication Office and to obtain the logistic advantages of a Naval District Headquarters.
2. Moving this activity brings to a close two years of close association with the OSS at Reseda. Throughout this entire time the OSS personnel at that station cooperated and assisted the Naval personnel in every possible way. This cooperation and the use of OSS facilities greatly aided the Navy's important work of maintaining radio security. The Chief of Naval Operations wishes to express his deep appreciation for the use of OSS property, facilities, and equipment which were made available to the Navy.

E. H. Rame

CC: BuDocks
Com 11

Oinc, USN Radio Mon. Sta., Reseda, Calif.

COMMENDATION FILE

Carha

7 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U. S. Navy Radio Monitor Station,
Reseda, California

I am enclosing for your information
a copy of a letter from the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations concerning the assistance given to
the Navy by OSS personnel at Reseda, California.

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

-3-

SECRET

station located near London has already begun constructing a second station and plans a third, for which ground is not yet broken. When the three have been completed the present station will be used only to agents in South Western Europe, the station now under construction will handle all traffic to agents in Central Europe, and the third station will carry all traffic with the Scandinavian peninsula. It is proposed that we should build, equip, staff, and operate the third station as part of the S.O.E. communications system. We should then use the entire S.O.E. network for all S.O. traffic and any other messages we might wish to clear through it in our own cipher.

B. It is further proposed that we should build a small independent station to be owned and staffed and controlled entirely by us and used for routine communications with a few agents more readily reached from the British Isles than from any other point, and for all emergencies.

-V- RECOMMENDATIONS

(~~Handwritten~~)
 [Signature]
 [Signature]
 A.K.E. Bruce

Committee

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

C. The crowded condition of these parts of the spectrum reserved for secret communication between England and agents on the continent makes perfect coordination between stations in England mandatory. Without it the entire secret communications network would be jeopardized.

D. The bulk of the traffic between England and the continent is carried for S.O.E. rather than S.I. (Fifteen hundred messages were cleared by the British S.O.E. organization in September.)

E. The British S.O.E. organization is opposed to the establishment of an independent American network for communicating with American S.O. agents on the continent for technical reasons that appear valid.

F. The British S.I. organization assumes that we shall insist upon having our own communications system for S.I. agents on the continent and elsewhere and will probably make no serious objection should we seek to establish a small transmitting and receiving station for this work in the British Isles.

IV. LINE OF ACTION

A. The British S.O.E. organization which now controls all its agents on the continent from one

SECRET

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN OF THE STAFF~~
~~OF WHICH PROJECT WILL BE PREPARED FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF~~

I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Communication by radio from England with agents in Europe.

II. OBJECTIVES

To establish transmitting and receiving facilities in England, in agreement with the British, for communicating with agents on the continent or elsewhere and for all emergency purposes, retaining the utmost freedom and independence of action.

III. FACTORS

A. As soon as any European theatre is assigned to any particular command, that command, whether it be British or American, will take over control of all S.O. agents in the area, whether they be British or American or other, and will also take over control of any S.O. radio station or stations used for communicating with them.

B. The work of S. O. agents in Europe is part of the Allied campaign and may well be terminated when the campaign is over, but S.O. agents work for their own country rather than under the Allied plan and may continue their work after the war.

SECRET

7
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

*Communications Plan
for London*

1212

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: November 20, 1942

To: Mr. Murphy
From: Major Lowman
Subject: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN FOR LONDON

Here is a photostatic copy of the memorandum which Colonel Donovan approved for our plans for Communications in London. He wanted a copy for his files.

I have also sent a copy to the office of the Secretariat.

CC: Capt. Doering

all

November 21, 1942

Colonel Gantier Parry

My dear Colonel Parry:

The enclosed memorandum sets forth the proposals of this Office as to the general arrangements to be made with British SOE and SI covering our radio communication to and from Great Britain. I understand from Captain Huot that these proposals are acceptable in principle to you and Sir Charles Hambro.

Captain Huot has been ordered to return to London as the representative of this Office to work out the details of this plan and to make all necessary arrangements for its execution. He is authorized to conclude with you on our behalf any agreement in this connection which may be necessary.

Captain Huot reports himself indebted to you for many courtesies and I should like to add my own thanks for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

Director

Enclosure

SECRET

November 23, 1940

Sir Charles Hambro

My dear Sir Charles:

The enclosed memorandum sets forth the proposals of this Office as to the general arrangements to be made with British SOE and SI covering our radio communication to and from Great Britain. I understand from Captain Huot that these proposals are acceptable in principle to you and Colonel Gambier Parry.

Captain Huot has been ordered to return to London as the representative of this Office to work out the details of this plan and to make all necessary arrangements for its execution. He is authorized to conclude with you on our behalf any agreement in this connection which may be necessary.

We are most grateful to you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

Director

Enclosure

SECRET

November 23, 1942

Lt.-Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, AUS
 Commanding General, Allied
 Forces in Africa
 c/o Commanding General, American
 Forces
 London, England

My dear General Eisenhower:

I inclose a copy of a memorandum which sets forth the proposals of this Office as to the general arrangements to be made with British SOE and MI covering Office of Strategic Services radio communication to and from Great Britain.

Captain Louis Huot, who was in London during the month of October studying this problem on behalf of this Office, reports that these proposals have been approved in principle by Sir Charles Hagaro and Colonel Gambrier Parry. During this time he maintained close liaison with Colonel Lyman of your staff and I understand that Colonel Lyman is familiar with these negotiations to date.

Captain Huot is now returning to London with authority to work out the details of this plan on behalf of this Office and to conclude any agreements which may be necessary to put it into execution. I have instructed him to obtain your formal approval before entering into any final commitments.

Sincerely,

Inc.

Director

SECRET

November 25, 1944

Captain Louis Huot
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

My dear Captain Huot:

I have approved the proposals set forth in the attached memorandum as to the arrangements to be made with British SOE and SI covering our radio communication to and from Great Britain.

You are authorized on behalf of the Office of Strategic Services to negotiate the details of this plan in London with the British representatives and to make all necessary arrangements for its execution. You are further authorized to conclude on behalf of the Office of Strategic Services any agreements in this connection which may be necessary.

You will, of course, report to American Theater Commander advised of your activities and obtain his formal approval before entering into any final commitments.

Sincerely,

Director

Attachment

SECRET

Mr. Phillips

- 2 -

November 17, 1944

him. The letter to General Eisenhower is in his possession and will be turned over to you should you wish to deliver it yourself.

Sincerely,

Enc.-5

Director

SECRET

November 21, 1944

Mr. William Phillips
Office of Strategic Services
American Embassy
72 Grosvenor Street
London, England

Dear Bill:

I enclose copies of the following:

1. Memorandum as to arrangements to be made with British SOE and SI covering our radio communication to and from Great Britain
2. Letter addressed to Colonel Gambrier Parry
3. Letter addressed to Sir Charles Hambro
4. Letter addressed to General Eisenhower
5. Letter addressed to Captain Huot

I believe that these inclosures are in general self explanatory. I should like to call your attention, however, to the fact that the text of the memorandum enclosed in the letters to Sir Charles and Colonel Parry differs slightly from the memorandum which accompanies this letter by reason of several minor deletions where the subject matter seems solely to concern this Office. For the most part, however, the two documents are identical. The copy of the memorandum which accompanies the letter to General Eisenhower is, of course, similar to your own.

I trust that it will be possible for Captain Huot to obtain prompt action when he returns to London and I will be grateful for any assistance which you can give.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

File
INTEROFFICE MEMO
100-1

Approved for Release
100-1
DATE: November 25, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT: Proposed Radio Communication Agreement
with British SOE and SI

Attached hereto are the following documents for your approval and signature:

1. Letter addressed to Colonel Gambier Parry
2. Letter addressed to Sir Charles Hambro
3. Letter addressed to General Eisenhower
4. Letter addressed to Captain Huot
5. Letter addressed to Mr. William Phillips

Captain Huot has informed us that you wish to authorize him to enter final agreements on behalf of OSS in connection with this matter. These letters have been drawn accordingly. We assume that in giving Captain Huot this full authority you have determined that it is not necessary to get separate approval for this arrangement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enc.-5

SCL
D.C.L.

Communication Center, 1012 A
1012 A
SECRET
x Agreement

February 10, 1943

TO: Lt. Colonel David Bruce
FROM: Colonel Donovan

With Colonel Lowman and Lieutenant Graveson I have been going over the agreement relative to the operation of the proposed station in England. Certain questions have arisen as to the interpretation of this agreement.

For fear that there might be some misunderstanding at a later date, as to our rights under this agreement, we all three thought that there should be some clarification as to its interpretation.

Upon its face it would appear that we are to be held in such strict control that it might interfere with the proper handling of the messages to our agents in the field. For example, it is very important there should be no mix-up in our operations under the Dipper Plan.

We concede that there must be one person in control. We concede too that they have the right to impose such regulations as would obtain security. We admit also that we are there on sufferance. We think, however, that the test to be applied to us should be the same test that Parry applies to SOE.

OSS Form 400 (a)

DATE 12/13/48

TO

Mr. C. Danneberg

*Witness to the
papers from your
file*

Q.

Office of the General Counsel

(42934)

Communication 10/10/43
4 P. 10/10/43
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - Communications Section
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 November 1943

See Summary
10/10/43

To: Colonel Buxton
 From: J. M. Scribner
 Subject: Channels of Communication Abroad

Commander Taylor in his letter of November 30th to you states in part as follows:

"... I believe that most communications from MO or any other branch in Washington should go to or at least through Heppner, if necessary in the form of an instruction to contact me, or there is nothing improper about communicating directly with me when the communication specifically concerns a matter being processed by this staff. . . ."


This raises a question which I believe involves all of OSS rather than merely MO. The system now in force involves communication, usually, directly to the parties at interest at levels lower than the Strategic Services Officer abroad or the Director in Washington. Of course, this is at variance with the military principle of addressing all communications to the Commanding Officer, distribution to the individual concerned being made by the Adjutant.

I believe that if we adopt the system of communicating to the C.O. for all purposes in SEAC (either for MO alone or even for all branches) a great deal of confusion will arise if the same thing is not done in all other theaters.

I am bringing this to your attention because I believe that the principle involved should be studied very carefully, should be decided on the highest levels, and should be made universal within OSS in whatever form the final decision takes.

Talked with Scribner + Fred
him to address C.O.
JMS

J. M. Scribner
 Deputy Director - SSO



Colonel Buxton

-2-

1/17/44

In order to make use of the existing Navy facilities not covered in this report, as soon as our own message center is set up in Chungking, we obtain permission from the Navy to use our own code and cipher system over Navy channels. Preliminary investigation on this point indicates there will be no trouble. Once our code clerks now on the way to Chungking arrive, this can be done and of course the use of existing Army and commercial facilities are available.

See attachments.

ama

May I have the traffic report back when the General has seen it —

Attachments:

28 Mar

R 1



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton

DATE: 17 January 1944

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT:

CONFIDENTIAL

General Donovan wrote you under date of December 1 asking for comments on a plan submitted by Captain Compton of OSS Communications. It was in answer to an inquiry of General Donovan as to the feasibility of establishing communications between Washington and New Delhi as an OSS project.

To sum up the attached report, here are the conclusions:

1. That there are now adequate facilities in the Far East to take care of present or any expansion of OSS traffic.
2. That our directive from the Joint Chiefs specifically states that where there are existing facilities of Army, Navy and/or commercial, OSS is to use them.

The attached report of Sgt. Jennings showing the present routing of communications facilities we believe shows adequately their existence.

3. The required equipment were the above not true, is not obtainable. Aside from this, the highly specialized manpower requirements would be extremely difficult to obtain.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

To facilitate our traffic problems, it is important that we immediately establish message centers at all important points so that our own code and cipher systems can be used.

This is rapidly being accomplished and manpower is either on the way or recruited awaiting transportation.

Since there now exist excellent Army and commercial facilities which the maps attached show, and since there are Navy facilities that should be made available to us, we suggest the following.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. METZEL, U.S.N.

Subject: Handling by OSS of Cables Received ~~Handled~~ Through Navy Facilities.

1. In view of recent ~~conferences and agreements reached~~ developments concerning SACO, the volume of OSS cable traffic has increased, and it is anticipated that this traffic will continue to increase with the expansion of OSS activities in China under these agreements. Accordingly, we have considered it necessary to make new arrangements as outlined below for the secure and effective distribution with OSS Washington of cables so transmitted.

(a) As rapidly as possible OSS is sending to Chungking code clerks who will upon their arrival encode and decode in OSS cipher messages sent to and from Washington and other points. These messages will be processed and distributed by the OSS Message Center in China in the same manner as all other cables, whether transmitted in OSS cipher or otherwise. Indicator lists will be furnished to the Navy Department.

(b) In Washington, both incoming and outgoing SACO messages will be given the same security handling by OSS as by the Navy. Messages whose disclosure would compromise the project will be encrypted in Secret systems, handled by a limited cryptographic group, kept out of the message center, and distributed only to those who need to know. Such messages include those which mention Tai Li or SACO or by address or otherwise link Alunab Chungking with either, or with OSS. Other messages may be processed by the message center and given normal distribution.

(c) In the interim period, prior to the establishment of the facilities outlined in paragraph 1-a above, we propose that paraphrased action and confirmation copies of all cables initiated by SACO messages will be handled in accordance with paragraph 1-b above, by OSS and transmitted through Navy channels be delivered to the OSS Message Center where they will be distributed in the same manner as all other cables. It is further proposed that the same procedure will apply in the case of cables relating to OSS activities which the Navy wishes to send to OSS for information.

2. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs have directed (JCS 155 11/D) that OSS use existing communication facilities wherever possible, it is requested that the Navy continue to permit this agency to transmit messages through Navy facilities when, as described in paragraph 1-a, the arrangements for the use of OSS ciphers are completed. We also request the Navy's concurrence in the procedure set forth in paragraph 1-b.

SECRET

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

A6

JAN 4 1944

Serial:

Memorandum For: Colonel Buxton, Acting Director, Office
of Strategic Services

1. Attached is revision of your proposed memorandum regarding OSS messages with changes which I consider necessary to make the new setup acceptable.

2. I have also changed the wording somewhat, as no agreements have been reached since General Donovan's departure and I can approve changes in our past arrangements only as expedient under present circumstances, and not by way of agreement with changes which I do not yet understand, or acceptance of any fait accompli.

W. R. Purnell
W. R. PURNELL
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

SECRET

Date: 1/13/44

To: Colonel Doering

SECRET

Attached letter from Admiral Purnell
with attachment: Memo for
Capt. Metzger, USN, in duplicate

Colonel Lowman's memo of Jan. 1/ and
report TELECOMMUNICATION ROUTES
BETWEEN WASHINGTON, LONDON,
CAIRO, AND ALGERIA AND CHINA,
INDIA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW
ZEALAND

This report should be attached
to this discussion.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

SECRET

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

(12674)

1100

67

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

On file - Record 58

24 JUL 1964

To		Room No.	Date	Officer's Initials	Comments
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				
W.L.H.	2058				

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with line number.

[illegible]

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in Te column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in Te column.
Each Officer should Initial & check mark insufficient before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

SECRET

20 January 1944

Dear Admiral L. B. Mitchell, USN
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

This will acknowledge receipt of your memorandum dated 14 January 1944, enclosing your revision of our proposed communications re-arranging of references.

I am informed by our Communications Officer that paragraph 1-(b) of your revision would require exceedingly difficult changes in our practices for handling his classified cable and radio messages. However, since General Donovan will return to Washington in the near future, I respectfully suggest that the matter be left in abeyance until his arrival. I know that he will wish to discuss it with you.

Sincerely yours,

W. Edward Ruxton
Acting Director

SECRET

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

28 Jan. 1944

- (c) The new location, called "Area 17" will be connected with the Cap Matifou radio base with direct keying and telephone lines in order that the long-distance alert system to Egypt and French West Africa can be operated from Area 17. The equipment necessary for said keying lines to be provided jointly by DSM and 2677th, whoever has it available, and the labor to install said keying lines to be arranged for by DSM.
 - (d) It is expressly understood that Area 17 is an American area under command of an American officer who is responsible to the Communications Officer, 2677th Headquarters Company. It is further understood that remote operation of transmitters for alert or any other purposes from Area 17 will be exercised by American personnel only and that any or all written material entering or leaving said area is subject to control of the OC, Station 17.
 - (e) The DSM will make arrangements for the feeding and housing of all French personnel and if said personnel is housed in the immediate neighborhood of Station 17, the Communication Officer, this Headquarters, will make the OC, Station 17, responsible for the discipline of said personnel from the viewpoint of security. French personnel will not be permitted to enter the Cap Matifou area.
 - (f) The Security Officer and Communications Officer, this Headquarters, requires that a list of names of all French personnel selected for Area 17 be submitted.
2. The above project has been discussed with Colonel Hays, Chief, S. I. Section, AFHQ, and has received his approval.

Peter G. S. Mero
 PETER G. S. MERO
 Major, Signal Corps
 Communications Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1. Col. Glavin ✓
- 2. Col. Rodrigo
- 3. Mr. Briggs
- 4. Capt. Miller

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH
2677TH HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
APO 512 U. S. ARMY

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

28 January 1944

Subject: Radio Counter-Intelligence;
Joint French Project

To: Officers Concerned

The following arrangement has been tentatively agreed upon during conversations between Captain Miller (for 1-2), Major Marc (for Communications), and Commandant Paillole (for DCM):

1. In order to improve counter measures against German clandestine agent transmitters operating in French North Africa and Morocco, it is considered desirable that the Direction Finding facilities of this organization be more effectively used for said purpose. Inasmuch as the DCM is actively engaged in combatting German espionage in said territory without the aid of proper Direction Finding facilities, it is believed to be in the interest of all parties concerned that the French radio installations be assisted by our Direction Finding units. In accordance with over-all policy, the following arrangement is suggested:
 - (a) This organization will provide a number of villas approximately two or three miles from our present radio base at Cap Matifou. In case difficulties arise in locating such villas the French Services will assist in obtaining same.
 - (b) DCM will provide 30 well-trained radio operators for the purpose of establishing a 24-hour intercept watch on 10 positions. DCM will transfer from their present location to the new location approximately four receivers that are now being used for this purpose. This organization will provide the balance of six receivers. 2677th Headquarters Company will further provide one officer and three enlisted men (one for each shift), which personnel will be qualified to instruct the French operators in the operation of intercept watches and any other procedure that the American OC considers necessary for the efficient performance of their duties.

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

Page 1.

2. Memo Report on Radio Counter-
Intelligence, Jt. French Proj. 28

Distribution Sheet - 17 Feb. 1944

SECRET

- 1 NATO (for Communications)
- 2 Gen. Magruder
Omdr. Morgan
Mr. Shepardon
X-2
Secretariat
- 3 Mr. Chaston
Col. Downing

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Robert Thrum

FROM : NATO

SUBJECT: Joint French Project

DATE: 6 April 1946

SECRET

Replying to the attached report on the Joint French Project for radio counterintelligence, you raised the question of what progress had been made.

Colonel Glavin sent cable 32421 to Algiers inquiring as to the progress and received in reply cable 28234 dated 25 March. The current status is simply that the project has been cleared with the French, security has been cleared with AFHQ and with Washington, and Algiers is now attempting to overcome difficulties in the procurement of a location such as that described in paragraph 1(a) of Major Mero's memo. Major Mero or Major Silveira will undoubtedly report further in their regular monthly reports.

Howe
Howard M. Chapin
Major, AUS

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton

DATE: 11 February 1944

FROM: Major Willis

SUBJECT:

Since there have been a good many cables and urgent requests for code clerks for FETO, I thought at this time prior to the General's return, you might like to have information as to the exact situation regarding this as it currently stands.

Now in the Far East	6 code clerks
On way by air or sea	5 " "
Waiting sea shipment	5 " "
Transferred from Cairo	2
(probably already enroute)	

Total 18

The distribution of these men to the various FETO areas, base stations and message centers, will be made by Major Falkner after consultation and review of the situation in the field with Berno and Coughlin. The arrival of these men will materially relieve the current pressure the men are working under now.

Jani.

cc Mr. Putzell

SECRET



JAN 11 1944

X 10

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Burton
 FROM: Major Willis
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 21 February 1944

Since there have been a good many cables and urgent requests for code clerks for FEYO, I thought at this time prior to the General's return, you might like to have information as to the exact situation regarding this as it currently stands.

Now in the Far East	6 code clerks
On way by air or sea	5 " "
Waiting sea shipment	5 " "
Transferred from Cairo (probably already enroute)	2

Total 18

The distribution of these men to the various FEYO areas, base stations and message centers, will be made by Major Falkner after consultation and review of the situation in the field with Berno and Coughlin. The arrival of these men will materially relieve the current pressure the men are working under now.

Gone.

cc Mr. Putzell

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

March 5, 1945

Dear Commander Graveson:

I want to take this opportunity to commend you and each officer and enlisted man of the Communications Branch STOUSSA for the outstanding work achieved in preparation for and during the invasion of France.

In an extremely short time your organization planned and provided communications facilities on an unprecedented scale for American and British clandestine operations and OSS Field Detachments with Armies and Army Groups, enabling them to give invaluable support to the invading armies in the liberation of France.

Without such facilities, it would have been wholly impossible for the Resistance Forces to have worked so closely with the Armies in driving the enemy out of France. Their dependence upon communications, and the efficiency and speed with which vital information, both strategic and tactical, was transmitted during this critical period reflected the greatest credit upon yourself, your officers, and men. With greatest pleasure I wish to record here my official commendation to you and your command for a difficult job splendidly executed.

It is directed that a copy of this letter be made a part of the official record of each officer and man concerned.

Sincerely,


William J. Donovan
Maj. General, U.S.A.
Director


COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

IONS





for Mr. L. A. L.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

13 SEP
2 SEAC-CHI
** H. R. B.*

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan
FROM: Major Willis
SUBJECT: SEAC-CBI Communications Setup

DATE: March 6, 1944

I believe you will be interested in the very clear and excellent map which was prepared by Major Falkner and Colonel Hall giving the picture of our Communications setup in Southeast Asia.

We have a duplicate of this for our own files here and I am sending this to you for your personal files.

I think it will interest you to know that we have just obtained permission from OPD for shipment to London during the week of March 10 to 17 for 45 code clerks. This is in addition to transportation which we already have for 14 others. It will complete Commander Graveson's entire request for code clerks. I consider that Captain Neller and Major Hoover of OSS Transportation deserve great credit for this since it is, I think, the first time transportation authorization has been given even before the actual reporting of the men to OSS. Colonel Connely's Branch did a superb job in the recruitment of these men for us.

Jaw.

END PAGE 1

SECRET

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
ETCUSA

VIA ARMY POUCH

3 March 1944

SUBJECT: Communications Training

TO : Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Today, accompanied by Commander Gravson, I visited Area "C". I found it a first class set-up. Much new equipment has been installed and it has a very worth while reserve capacity. Captain Swenson, the CO, has gotten his physical lay-out developed to almost a point of completion. His officers are young, interested and the group appeared to be congenial. The enlisted men appeared to be well above average. You have seen the lay-out so I won't elaborate here except on one important subject, namely, training.

Captain Swenson told me that he strongly recommends eliminating the general training that Communications give men at "C" in the United States. He said they had to give entirely new training here and that it would be much better if the enlisted men were shipped here as soon as they were processed for shipment. Recently the Personnel Procurement Branch recruited some especially well qualified "Radio operator, Mechanics" from the Air Corps. These are top flight boys that have been trained for bomber communications radio operators. Major Willis will tell you how good they are and it is the thought here that immediate shipment would speed things up. Of course, it will take two to three weeks to process them and during that time some additional training could be given them in Washington but only as a "time filler".

With the recruiting of radio men now completed the minute the ETO quota has been filled it might be well to have a look at Area "C" in the U.S. in order to determine whether or not a portion of the training program could be discontinued, making it possible to operate with a smaller station complement and less instructors. Personnel so released could either be used elsewhere in OSS or turned back to the Army and thereby release slots for other use. However, the unnecessary personnel, both officers and enlisted men, should be carefully screened before being turned back because it would be better to keep them if at all useful rather than recruit similar personnel. This all ties into your thought of conserving manpower. That is, of course, secondary in importance to deciding the question of keeping personnel in the United States as short a time as possible when it needs special training after arrival in a theater.

[Signature]
Colonel E. Connely

*copies have been sent
as directed to
Wesley
Wesley
Wesley*

United States

SECRET

Equal to

IN & IN DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
WASHDC

VIA ARMY POUCH

3 March 1944

SUBJECT: Commandations Training

TO : Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Today, accompanied by Commander Greenberg, I visited Area 'C'. I found it a first class set-up. Much new equipment has been installed and it has a very worth while reserve capacity. Captain Swanson, the CC, has gotten his physical lay-out developed to about a point of completion. His officers are young, interested and the group appeared to be congenial. The enlisted men appeared to be well above average. You have seen the lay-out so I won't elaborate here except on one important subject, namely, training.

Captain Swanson told me that he strongly recommends eliminating the general training that Communications give men at "C" in the United States. He said they had to give entirely new training here and that it would be much better if the enlisted men were shipped here as soon as they were processed for shipment. Recently the Personnel Procurement Branch recruited some especially well qualified "Radio operators, Mechanics" from the Air Corps. These are top flight boys that have been trained for better communications radio operators. Major Willis will tell you how good they are and it is the thought here that immediate shipment would speed things up. Of course, it will take two to three weeks to process them and during that time some additional training could be given them in Washington but only as a "time filler".

With the recruiting of radio men now completed the minute the SAC quota has been filled it might be well to have a look at Area 'C' in the U. S. in order to determine whether or not a portion of the training program could be discontinued, making it possible to operate with a smaller station complement and less instructors. Personnel so released could either be used elsewhere in CC or turned back to the Army and thereby release slots for other use. However, the unnecessary personnel, both officers and enlisted men, should be carefully screened before being turned back because it would be better to keep them if at all useful rather than recruit similar personnel. This all ties into your thought of conserving manpower. That is, of course, secondly in importance to deciding the question of keeping personnel in the United States as short a time as possible when it needs special training after arrival in a theater.

Colonel E. Connelley

cc/Mr. Cheston
cc/Major Willis

RECEIVED 14 MAR 1944

United States

SECRET

10001

26. Colonel Lowman

General Donovan asks for your
comments on the attached letter
from Colonel Connely.

WJ Tarrant
Warren J. Tarrant
2d Lt, AGD

Director's Office

(3908)

General Donovan

-2-

3/17/46

in the Far East we may suddenly be faced with the necessity of taking care of a number of students at one time. I see no point in burning our bridges, as instruction manpower and operating personnel now at C have taken months and months to build up. It can't very well be discarded to be gathered together another day.

We are keeping in constant touch to see that the efficiency of the training side can be maintained at minimum cost.

As you know, a committee is making a survey of the efficiency of this branch as to the proper use of its personnel, etc. Their report will give an independent viewpoint of the question raised by Colonel Connely and Captain Swenson.



MAY 18 1946

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Colonel Lowman

DATE: 3/17/44

SUBJECT: Report dated March 3, 1944, attached.

Captain Swenson's statement in Colonel Connely's first sentence of paragraph 2 is the opinion of one officer of extremely limited knowledge of our operations.

As far as ETO is concerned where men are recruited who have had top flight previous training, the training that they are given at C Camp is only for the following purposes: (1) To keep up their code speeds so that they won't grow stale, (2) To keep them active and learning while they are waiting transportation.

That the procedure itself is different in England and that they have to be re-taught to some extent, is of course true.

As to Colonel Connely's suggestion that we consider cutting down the size of C Camp--we are meeting this first of all by closing up M because of lessened manpower requirements. This closing of M will throw an added burden on C.

However, we are still required to train and process radio operators for other theaters. The fact that the ETO Table of Organization is almost filled, has nothing to do with our requirements for other theaters, not only for base station communication personnel, but for agent operators.

On this latter point having to do with student training, the estimates of SO and SI have somewhat exceeded the actual trainees processed through the school. Some flexibility must be maintained, since with the increase of activities

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d. With respect to authentication of messages transmitted by War Department facilities, it was agreed that an officer should authenticate all such messages, and that this authentication would indicate responsibility of the authenticating officer for correctness of all details of a message, including address, form, content (especially guarding against stereotypic phraseology), classification, and precedence.

e. With respect to the cryptographic systems involved, it was agreed that the intermixing of message traffic, pertaining to the same subject, in War Department and OSS cryptographic systems was unsound cryptographic security practice, and that action would be taken by OSS, wherever possible, to insure that all OSS message traffic on a particular subject was handled in a single cryptographic channel, either War Department or OSS, but not intermixed in both.

f. It was further agreed that Lt. Col. Goodrich would furnish a representative of OSS with information pertaining to pertinent War Department regulations and letter instructions, concerning message handling procedure and security measures, and advise and assist this representative of OSS in the preparation of a comprehensive paper on the subject for dissemination to originators of messages in OSS.

g. In connection with the precedence assigned to a message, it was agreed that War Department regulations and letter instructions would be observed.

2. It is believed that implementation of the agreements indicated above will eliminate any obstacles, from the point of view of security, to the establishment of a more direct procedure than now applies for handling OSS messages transmitted via War Department facilities.

3. The matter of coordinating messages was discussed, and it was agreed that this was not a matter primarily involving security, and therefore should be further discussed in connection with any procedure that may be adopted for handling of messages between the War Department and OSS prior to transmission via War Department facilities.

STANLEY R. GOODRICH,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry

COPY

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CONFIDENTIAL

22 April 1944

MID/911

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL CECIL J. GRIDLEY:

Subject: Security of OSS Message Handling Procedure

1. Pursuant to the suggestion made by Col. Gridley, at the meeting held in his office on 20 April 1944 for the purpose of arriving at a suitable procedure in the handling of OSS message traffic transmitted via War Department channels, Col. Lowman of OSS and Lt. Col. Goodrich of G-2 have examined the security aspects of OSS classified messages, and the following report is rendered:

a. The general principle was agreed upon that, where OSS was permitted to utilize War Department cryptographic channels, the War Department security regulations and instructions concerning the handling of messages transmitted by such means should govern.

b. Based upon observations made in the OSS Message Center, and information furnished by Col. Lowman and Maj. DeLafield of OSS, it was agreed that the message handling procedure of OSS is sufficiently secure to meet War Department requirements. Some improvements can be made, such as (1) indicating upon outgoing message forms that reproduction of the exact contents thereof is prohibited, and (2) requiring acknowledgment of receipt of messages by signature of the recipient for messages disseminated within OSS.

c. Exploration of the matter of drafting messages and the elimination of stereotypic phraseology, particularly from beginnings and endings, developed the point that OSS has placed responsibility for cryptographic security, in this respect, largely upon their Message Center, whereas War Department regulations place a large share of responsibility for properly drafting messages upon the originators of messages. Since personnel of a Message Center, motivated by a fear of changing the meaning of messages prepared by high ranking officers, have a natural hesitancy about rewording and changing such messages, it was agreed by Col. Lowman that an effort would be made to make originators of messages in the various sections of OSS responsible for the proper drafting of their messages. Lt. Col. Goodrich agreed to assist in this matter to the extent of his ability, and as requested by Col. Lowman.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF**Subject: Use of War Department Cable Facilities
by OSS****Attention: Colonel Cecil J. Gridley, U.S.A.**

1. OSS desires to simplify and expedite those of its messages which are handled through the cryptographic systems of the War Department. In order to determine a method of procedure agreeable to all concerned, conferences have been held with Colonel Gridley and Lt. Colonel Dorrance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Colonel Humelsine of the War Department Classified Message Center; Colonel Fahnestock and Lt. Colonel Goodrich of G-2; and Colonel Lowman, Lt. Colonel Sands, Lt. Colonel Deering, and Major Delafield of OSS.

2. All of the above mentioned officers are agreeable to the below outlined procedure in handling messages in War Department cryptographic systems if the recommendations contained in Lt. Colonel Goodrich's memorandum to Colonel Gridley of 22 April 1944 are adopted.

3. It is therefore requested that the following procedure for the handling of OSS messages through the cryptographic systems of the War Department be approved:

a. Outgoing Messages: All outgoing messages will be sent by the OSS Message Center direct to the War Department Classified Message Center by OSS courier for transmission. OSS will accept the responsibility of coordinating through its Theater Officers, all such messages with the War Department.

b. Incoming Messages: All OSS messages received by the War Department Classified Message Center for delivery to OSS, will be sent direct to the OSS Message Center. OSS will arrange for the courier service required for this procedure, and will paraphrase the clear text messages before dissemination is made. The responsibility for any dissemination within the War Department is left with the War Department Classified Message Center.

William J. Donovan
Director

SANDS:BLACK

CONFIDENTIAL

055 Form 100-10

DATE 6 May 1944

TO: The Secretariat

The attached memorandum
has been approved by Colonel
Gridley.

It is recommended for
General Donovan's signature.

*Recommended
I don't understand
the purpose of the
last sentence*

FROM: Lt.Col. O. J. Sands, Jr.

Rm. 116 Central EXT. 2412
(32816)

OSS FORM #001a

Date 5-9-44To: General Donovan

1. The attached is resubmitted for your signature.
2. The effect of the last sentence of the memorandum, which you question, is to shift dissemination within the War Department of OSS messages sent in WD cipher from G-2, which now does it, to the classified message center, which is in the Deputy Chief's office. The War Dept. will insist on some dissemination, determined by them, within the Dept., or will refuse to handle ^{our} messages at all. In other words, the dissemination is made now but hereafter will be determined by the message center rather than G-2. Colonel Sands says that in the opinion of General Magruder's office, this is a highly desirable move.


 D. C. Lee

Office of the Secretary

(9139)

CONFIDENTIAL

14 May 1946

**MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL FRANK MCCARTHY, SECRETARY
GENERAL STAFF**

**Subject: Use of War Department Cable Facilities
by OSS.**

**Enclosure: Copy of memorandum for OSS, dated 14 May 46,
subject as above.**

Above enclosure is forwarded for your information.

For the proper guidance of OSS it is requested that that office be furnished with copies of all applicable security regulations and instructions concerning the handling of messages transmitted through War Department cryptographic channels.

(SIGNED)

**A. J. McFARLAND
Colonel, G.S.G.
Secretary**

Copy for the Director of Strategic Services



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 May 1944


*Communications**x War Dept**x Facilities**x Cable**x S*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Subject: Use of War Department Cable Facilities
by OSS.Reference: OSS Memorandum for JCS, dtd 6 May 44, subject
as above.Enclosure: Copy of memorandum for Colonel McCarthy,
dtd 16 May 44, subject as above.

1. The procedure for handling OSS messages through cryptographic systems of the War Department requested by you in paragraph 3 of above reference has been approved by direction of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, subject to continued implementation of recommendations mentioned in paragraph 2 of above reference.
2. Direct contact between your office and War Department agencies concerned in this matter is authorized.
3. The War Department has been requested to furnish you with all applicable security regulations and instructions concerning the handling of messages transmitted through War Department cryptographic channels. Above enclosure is furnished for your information.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


 Cecil J. GRIDLEY
 Colonel, U.S.A.
 Assistant Secretary
**CONFIDENTIAL***MOS*

OSS FORM 4001a

Date 18 May 1944

To: Colonel Burton

CONFIDENTIAL

A copy of the attached has been sent to Col. Sands with a request that he advise Col. Lowman and others concerned. Col. Sands, as you may know, was handling the request on this matter which went to the JCS.

Attachment

DCZ
D. C. C.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

10 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

**Subject: Use of War Department Cable Facilities
by OSS.**

**Reference: JCS Memorandum for OSS, dated 26 May 1944,
subject as above.**

This office has been informed by the Secretary of the General Staff to the effect that Special Branch of G-3 of the General Staff is furnishing the Communication and Message Center Branch of OSS with all applicable security regulations and instructions concerning the handling of messages over War Department cryptographic facilities.

CECIL J. GRIMM
Colonel, U.S.A.
Assistant Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Subject: Use of War Department Cable Facilities
by OSS.

Reference: JCS Memorandum for OSS, dated 16 May 1944,
subject as above.

This office has been informed by the Secretary of the General Staff to the effect that Special Branch of G-3 of the General Staff is furnishing the Communication and Message Center Branch of OSS with all applicable security regulations and instructions concerning the handling of messages over War Department cryptographic facilities.

Cecil J. Gridley
CECIL J. GRIDLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Secretary



CONFIDENTIAL

May 10, 1944

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I believe steps need to be taken which will afford full assurance that communications to and from the various Federal departments and agencies do not disclose or become a source of information of value to the enemy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would seem to be in the best position to be of assistance in this regard.

Accordingly, I wish that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would proceed to make a survey of all cryptographic systems and related procedures now in use or proposed to be used by any Federal department or agency, utilizing in this survey the services and facilities of the Joint Communications Board. The survey should consist of an examination of the codes, ciphers, cipher devices, cipher machines, and other equipment in use for secret or confidential communications; of all procedures relating thereto; of all methods of handling such communications; of the adequacy of cryptographic personnel; and, generally, of the means and equipment utilized in connection with the physical security of such communications.


It is my desire that all Federal departments and agencies concerned cooperate fully with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their designated representatives in this connection. These departments and agencies should be represented by representatives to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their representatives should be given information pertinent to the survey and should also permit access by the Joint Chiefs and their representatives to any records, systems, devices, and equipment involved in the survey. I wish you would forward to each such department or agency, on my behalf, a copy of this letter.

At
as the J
to have

and at such earlier times
necessary, I should like
suggestions and recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of
the United States Army
and Navy.





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 May 1944

Brigadier General Wm. J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
Twenty-fifth and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

The enclosed copy of a letter from the President to Admiral Leahy, dated 10 May 1944, is forwarded to you in accordance with the wish of the President expressed in the letter.

In compliance with the further wishes of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have instructed the Joint Communications Board to initiate the action necessary to accomplish the survey of cryptographic systems and related procedures outlined in the second paragraph of the letter, and to that end have authorized the Board to communicate with you with respect to the details of such arrangements for the survey as may be necessary or desirable.

Your cooperation in effecting the survey and any assistance you can render the Joint Communications Board will be very much appreciated.

Yours very sincerely,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

Encl.

100-101013

Two letters re survey of cryptologic systems by Joint Communications Group

Distribution Sheet - 22 May 1964

- 1 Col. Lowman
- 2 Maj. Delafield
- 3 Gen. Magruder
- 4 Col. Bigelow
- 5 Mr. Howland
- 6 Mrs. Griggs
- 7 Secretariat
- 8 Files

Date _____

General

~~falls~~
The summary is now
under way Col.

Loumon is in charge
of it for you & Col.

Buxton - He says that
things are well in hand

Office of the Executive Officer *agg*

(30449)

SECRET**ENCLOSURE****REPORT OF A SURVEY.**
CONDUCTED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND RELATED PROCEDURES IN USE
IN THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**a. Finding:**

Double transposition and strip systems are extensively used by OSS. These do not provide the same degree of security as other OSS systems, and are not well adapted to the cryptographic plan. For this reason, OSS plans to reduce the use of double transposition systems to an absolute minimum, and to replace those strip systems in use between main bases with available cipher machines, and those strip systems in use between main bases and sub-bases with one-time pads.

Recommendation:

That the current OSS cryptographic program be expedited.

b. Finding:

The procedure for destruction of obsolete cryptographic material is not uniform; that is, destruction of such material is accomplished partly in the field and partly by returning such material to Washington for destruction there.

Recommendation:

That a uniform procedure be adopted; i.e., that destruction be made either entirely in the field or by returning such material to Washington for destruction there, whichever is more practicable.

SECRET**Enclosure**



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

14 July 1944.

Brig. General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

On 12 May 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to you a copy of a letter from the President to Admiral Leahy, regarding a survey of the cryptographic systems and related procedures in use by the various Federal departments and agencies.

Pursuant to this letter and to arrangements subsequently made with the Office of Strategic Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted a survey of the cryptographic systems and procedures used by the OSS and enclose herewith a report of their findings and recommendations. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed of the action taken upon these recommendations in order that the definitive results of the survey may be set out in the final report to the President.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to express their appreciation of the cooperation of the Office of Strategic Services in effecting the survey.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Alfred J. McFarland
A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary

*Ch. Lowman notified
to take care of this*

2/18/44

SECRET

General Donovan

-2-

7/26/44

B. A letter will go out to all field officers instructing all holders of material to destroy it in the field. This will be done only upon receipt of word from us to do so and will contain appropriate instructions as to method of destruction for reports, forms, etc.

As you can well see, neither of these matters is in any serious. We consider all questions involving cryptographic security important enough to act on, regardless of the degree of seriousness involved.

I would like to comment further by stating that as far as A is concerned, a number of these systems were set up for us. The changeover spoken of is a result of the initiative of Lt. Commander Simpson of the Communications Branch who ran across a system used by the Navy of greater security than anything we had heretofore used.

The ingenuity of Major Delafield has resulted in the wide substitution of this new system almost throughout OSS, particularly wherever our agents could be reached and the substitution made. This is the one-time pad system referred to. These pads are manufactured and distributed from our own message center here and you might be interested in seeing the setup.

I feel that in view of this extremely favorable report, a note from you to Major Delafield would be most appropriate. I would appreciate it very much if you would consider this request.


SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT: Report of Survey of Cryptographic Systems conducted by JCS

DATE: 25 July 1946

X Cryptographic Machine

General McFarland's letter of July 14 requests that the Joint Chiefs be informed of the action taken upon the recommendations accompanying the letter.

As Major Delafield points out, this report is essentially negative since although it makes two recommendations for changes, it does not tell specifically in what respects our activities are satisfactory.

On the other hand, we have full assurance of the committee investigating that this agency stood, comparatively speaking, extremely high up in its security.

At your request I asked Colonel Gridley to please check and see just where we stood, particularly in view of this rather negative report. He confirmed the fact that our record was excellent; that he was highly pleased with our showing.

He further explained that because all agencies were involved and because there was a normal danger in discussing pros and cons of security, the JCS only sent out the subjects for correction.

In answering the letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff I am pleased to tell you that we can already state that both the A and B findings are being taken care of.

A. We are proceeding with the new equipment and are replacing the old systems as fast as possible. To accelerate the program, Major Delafield has started a review of all systems we now have in use and a letter has been sent to the field asking them to give us full information so that replacements can be made more quickly.

SECRET

14.07.44
X Survey
X Cryptographic Systems
27 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR DELAFIELD

I have just received from Colonel Lowman a report on the Survey of Cryptographic Systems conducted by JCS.

It was a great satisfaction to note that this Agency has met this test with credit. Colonel Lowman tells me that, because of your ingenuity, you were fully responsible for establishing the new system which made this good record possible.

This is to let you know that the organization is being advised of your contribution and I personally wish to express my appreciation of the intelligent and loyal service you are giving to OSS.

William J. Donovan
Director

Comment: 14475
x Attorney x President
x Cryptographic Division
SECRET

1 August 1944

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland
 Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Washington, D. C.

My dear General McFarland:

I am pleased to be able to advise you that we have taken steps to carry out both recommendations a. and b. as set forth in the enclosure to your letter of 14 July 1944 concerning the recent survey of cryptographic systems and related procedures.

To accelerate our program for replacing our former systems with new equipment in accordance with recommendation a., the officer in charge of our Message Center has initiated a review of all systems now in use and has forwarded a letter to the field requesting such information as will enable us to accelerate the shipment of replacements.

With reference to recommendation b., we are sending a letter to all our Strategic Services Officers setting up a uniform procedure for the destruction of obsolete cryptographic material in the field.

As it is our endeavor to adhere to the highest possible standards in all matters involving cryptographic systems, we were happy to cooperate with the survey of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to have the benefit of their recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
 Director

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
FROM : Colonel Lowman
SUBJECT: Catalogue of Communications Equipment.

DATE: 7 July 1944

This catalogue reminded me so much of one of my early conversations with you about equipment that I couldn't resist sending it along. I think I asked you how much equipment we should get, and if I recall correctly, your answer was, "Be sure we have enough".

After two years and a half, we have just about reached that point.

Catalogue returned

SECRET

Colonel Lawrence H. Lowman, Washington, DC, 26 July 1944 - Page Two

of what we were led to believe would be handled, and it is extremely doubtful if it will ever increase to any great extent. The staff at Istanbul is being cut to a bare operating minimum.

Thanks to our good friend, Major Perry, we are in an extremely enviable position with regard to necessary supplies to enable us to augment existing bases in Italy and elsewhere and completely equip others in every respect and several tons of equipment are now packed and will be flown to Italy under high air priority just as we have successfully done in the past. The mobile vehicles have all been modified and put into first class shape and this includes the circus wagons, the 302, and another radio jeep and we are merely awaiting a release from "WARNE" to enable us to get these vehicles out of the theater and over to Italy by a fast convoy.

This about winds up the summary of the latest manpower and equipment situation up to the present moment. A radio-gram was received from Col. Gavin requesting me to report as Col. Morro's Deputy to Caserta or Rome to assume duties as senior communications officer in view of Morro's illness in Washington and these new duties will also involve supervision of the entire Vulcan show also I assume, and will probably result in my being in international air commuter. While I am familiar in a general way with most of the activities across the Mediterranean in the French and Italian sectors, future plans will have to rest until I get to Caserta or Rome which will probably be within a week, inasmuch as travel orders and theater approval have just been received.

In view of the General's and your expressed wishes, you can rest assured I will continue to do my best.

For the Strategic Services Officers

Sincerely,

SECRET

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

26 July 1944

Colonel Lawrence H. Lowman,
Chief, Communications Branch,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Larry,

At this time I feel that you should be posted on what has actually transpired so far in the merging of communications facilities in the Mediterranean Basin. Immediately upon receiving definite confirmation of the merger of the two theaters, action was started to cut Cairo and the Balkan setup down to the bare operating minimum in the hope of being able to salvage some manpower for use in Italy and other places. Unfortunately, we find that the Greek picture, as a result of the past year's experience and planning, is just about reaching its peak or will within the next thirty days, with the arrival in the field of the final ten teams now processed. Until these ten teams actually come on the air, there is the old question of manpower and endless listening watches in spite of the most carefully prepared signal plans. With these ten teams, it will bring our actual circuits from Cairo up to 42. Last week the message center handled 656 messages, which is the biggest week we have had yet. Ninety-five per cent of these messages were in double transposition, being in the same percentage strictly intelligence coming from Greece and vicinity. This Greek traffic will continue to increase until the last of the ten new teams is in the fold. When that occurs, we can consider Cairo at its peak. Of course the complexion of the whole picture may change over-night if the Germans withdraw from Greece, which, according to all reliable sources, is not liable to occur. Indications are that the Germans in Greece will continue firing until the final surrender. The question of reducing the Greek circuits is not for me in Communications to decide. It is a matter for the higher echelons and Col. Toulmin and I have often discussed this matter. The intelligence coming out of Greece is considered extremely worthwhile and vital to the extent that members of the Greek Desk are alerted all night in order to handle important messages at any hour, especially target information.

Thus, it will be seen that until others decide that the Greek picture should be cut down, we must maintain our present operating staff in Cairo as long as the Greek Desk remains here. In conjunction with Greek activities, three bases are maintained in Turkey, i.e., Izmir, Boston and Key West, through which all agents, operators, and supplies are handled. This is an extremely important function and necessitates reliable communication between the three bases and Cairo. A large amount of traffic is handled daily by these three bases.

This leaves the question of Istanbul. In spite of the optimistic demands of this base on us, actual radio traffic handled is but a small fraction

SECRET

General Donovan

-2-

8/1/44

I discussed this point with Commander McBaine on his return and his feeling was that this could not be done in the field, and that the main control rested in Washington. This ultimately may be true, but from a strict operating standpoint, I should think the quality counts and that present limitations we are faced with in that theater must guide the policy.

As to Major Porter's statement that 95% of the messages are in double transposition, this too should be corrected to some extent by our message centers in substituting other systems requiring less time on the part of those enciphering and deciphering the messages. Steps will be taken along these lines immediately.

ONE

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Colonel Lowman
 SUBJECT: Limitations of Communications Facilities--Cairo.

DATE: 3 August 1944

Enclosed is a letter dated July 26 from Major Porter, Communications. You will see that it speaks of a ceiling that will soon be reached due to the limited allocation of communications manpower at Cairo.

This same question was raised in a recent letter from Mr. Penrose which I have discussed at some length with Colonel Aldrich.

It has been my conviction that an approach to a ceiling can be regulated top side by exercising control over two main factors. (1) By taking it for granted that the information from the agent in the field is of first importance, administrative traffic can be regulated or controlled accordingly. Regulation of administrative traffic is the second suggestion.

As to the first, although I fully realize, having been at the base and having seen traffic come in from the field, many elements are involved, nevertheless I am convinced that a certain restriction of agent traffic is feasible and proper.

For example, there are a number of teams in Greece. Obviously, some are more productive than others. Editorial control can be exercised through careful handling with the desk and in turn with those in the field.

It is obvious that the teams must be encouraged and that the ardor of the desks should not be dampened, but we have long passed the point where just the very fact they have operatives in the field is enough.

SECRET

ONS FORM 1158-6

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Communications Branch

DATE 8/3/44

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Colonel Lowman

Before making other distribution I
wanted to be sure you were in accord with
the conclusions drawn.

If so, can Mrs. Haight please distribute
the copies attached to:

Col. Aldrich
Col. Bigelow
Mr. Shepardson
(a) Major Perry. (b) Major Delafield

(23931)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *Mr. Donovan*
 Lt. Colonel Donovan

FROM : Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT: Cairo Operations

DATE: 17 November 1944

Please see cable 41784 from Wilson, action Glavin, information 100.

Lt. Colonel Porter who is here, makes the following comment which I think is worth passing on to your attention for discussion with General Donovan.

"I view the last paragraph of basic communication with much interest as this is a proposal I initiated some time ago. For a long time I have failed to see the reason why the Greek desk had to remain in Cairo, especially as the Greek Government moved first to Italy and now is located in Athens. It has always appeared to me to be perfectly feasible to hook up Athens, Elba and Istanbul direct with Bari/Gaserta, thus cutting out Cairo radio facilities in their entirety. Some men could be released from Cairo to Mero, together with all the necessary additional equipment, to maintain the additional load. Practically all signal plans now in existence between Cairo and the few agent teams that are left in the field, could be swung right over to Italy, especially now that most of these agents are readily accessible. However, the matter of moving the Greek desk from Cairo is not a matter for communications to decide, but rather a matter of higher policy. At any rate, I am in favor of the establishment of the Italy/Athens link as a start in the right direction."

It would seem if this had the General's approval and were done, and if this were feasible from Colonel Glavin and Lt. Colonel Mero's standpoint, that we could release a lot of men for Far East operations and at the same time more rapidly close down our Cairo operations. This may or may not be the desire of the Director, and is, of course, a policy matter that would require his consideration and decision.

SOAB

CONFIDENTIAL *Red F*

*Please prepare
 Memo to
 C. H. T. Redman
 Why this cannot be done*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • CONFIDENTIAL • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Colonel W. W. Aldrich

Nov 25 2 21 PM '44

DATE: 25 November 1944

FROM : The Secretariat

SUBJECT:

As you will note from the attached, General Donovan requested that a cable be dispatched to you and Colonel Blavin asking whether the suggestion made by Colonel Lowman could not be adopted.

We have held off dispatching any such cable, pending your arrival and an expression of views by you.

C. D. Bane
Charles A. Bane
Lt., USN
Chief, Secretariat

*Added & offered as
expressed to WT D and
Subj (lettering)*

CONFIDENTIAL

cAB
cable 41724 from Wilson -- *Hunter, Cairns #15-*

OSR FORM 3061

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
FREE

Letter
Memo
Cable ☒

re _____

DATED:

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT:

32241 (OUT 9260) to Caserta

13974 (IN 10960) from Pader

check action

ORIGINAL FILED IN: _____

FILE #: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

23 March 1945

SUBJECT: Request for Radio Equipment.

TO : Major G. S. Perry, 25th and E Streets, N. E., Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. In accordance with your conversation with the undersigned on 12 Mar 45, request is made for the following equipment:

14 each SST-1 Radio Receiver and Transmitter Units, moisture and fungus proofed, each including the following components:

SST-1G Receiver 3.4-10.5 megacycles
SST-1D Transmitter
SST-1D Dual Power Unit for C-Volt DC or
90 to 230-Volt AC operation
GN-45 Hand Generator, modified operational
spare parts

14 each SST-1 Radio Receiver and Transmitter Units with sub-
mersion proofed receivers and transmitters, each Unit
including the components listed above

4 each SSP-5A Radio Receiver, battery operated with operational
spare parts and headphones

6 each BA-48 Batteries

6 each BA-2 Batteries

3 each BA-23 Batteries

2. It is understood that the moisture and fungus proofed models
will be available approximately 1 Apr 45; and that the submersion proofed
model will be available in approximately 90 days.

3. Delivery is requested as soon as the equipment becomes available.
Major Leo H. Crosson, REpublic 6700, Extension 4508, will arrange to pick
up the materials from your Warehouse when they are available.

Leo H. Crosson
LEO H. CROSSON
Major, Inf.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Colonel Lowman

DATE: March 28, 1946

SUBJECT: MIS Request for Special OSS Radio Equipment

Attached is the original of a request from MIS calling for 14 of the latest type OSS agent sets with hand generators and 14 more of the new model at such time as it is completed.

This request came about through an investigation by MIS of sources of OSS supplies. One of our engineers ran into an MIS man in one of the plants. He was interested in ordering the same equipment.


When the matter was reported to me, I asked how many sets were required and suggested since the quantity was small that instead of their tying on to our own orders, thereby confusing our own delivery picture, that their request be directed to us.

Incidentally, during the course of conversation with Major Croason, Major Perry was led to believe the sets were to be used in Northern China.

In view of the fact that we are having most unfortunate difficulties in obtaining necessary issuance of cryptographic equipment for our every day use, I thought this matter should be brought to your attention at this time, in this way, since we are preparing a letter of appeal for your signature to the Joint Security Board. It is thought necessary to take this step since we have had a turn down from General Bissel on one type of equipment and every indication of a turn down on an alternate type of equipment.

We would like to discuss both these subjects with you at your convenience.

cc to: Lt. Bano
Major Delafield



General
You want to
take this up with
Binell.

✓ EDP

Lt. Ridgell The
came out from
the gene with
re comment

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lieut. Putzell
 FROM : Major Willis
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 4/20/46

NM

"In the attached, if you recall, we included this matter in our cable last night to the General in which we also brought up the matter of the OSRD request for SCTR-1 sets, as well as some of Lovell's advice. Colonel Lowman is undoubtedly with him now and their reply should, I hope, clear this matter up. I am not sure, but I think you have the formal request on this which was written to the Director's Office, so you had better keep all the papers together until we hear.

Will.

FOR COPIED AND RETURN

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 March 1946

Chief, Military Intelligence Service
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Russell H. Sweet, GSC, Chief, Captured Personnel
and Material Branch

Dear Sir: C. C. S. L.

In reply to your letter of 10 April 1945 requesting special radio equipment, I am directing our Communications Branch to notify Major Leo H. Crosson that the equipment itemized in your request will be made immediately available to you.

I would like to bring to your attention that these radio receiver-transmitter units are in very great demand for our operations in all theaters and there is a very limited production of them available to us. For this reason, it has been necessary for us to weigh carefully in the order of priority based on the urgency of need, the various requests which are made of us for this specialized communications set.

Major Perry of the Communications Branch will contact directly Major Leo H. Crosson in regard to the movement of this equipment.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RHS/LAG/14

10 April 1948

SUBJECT: Request for Radio Equipment.

TO : Director, Office of Strategic Services, 25th and S Streets,
N. W., Washington, D. C.

1. Request is made for the following equipment:

14 each SSR-1 Radio Receiver and Transmitter Units, moisture
and fungus proofed, each including the following com-
ponents:SSR-1G Receiver 2.4-16.3 megacycles
SST-1D Transmitter
SSP-1D Dual Power Unit for 6-volt DC or 90 to
230 volts AC operation
GN-46 Hand Generator
Operational Spare Parts4 each SSR-5A Radio Receivers, battery-operated, with opera-
tional spare parts2. This request has been informally coordinated between Major G. S.
Perry of OSS and Major Leo H. Crosson of this Branch.3. Delivery is requested as soon as equipment is available. Major
Leo H. Crosson, Republic 6700 Extension 4508 will receive the equipment
from your warehouse, or other designated location, when it is available.

FOR THE CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE:

RUSSELL H. SWENZ
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Captured Personnel
and Material Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

RHS/LH/ML

10 April 1945

SUBJECT: Request for Radio Equipment.

TO : Director, Office of Strategic Services, 25th and E Streets,
 N. W., Washington, D. C.

1. Request is made for the following equipment:

14 each SSTR-1 Radio Receiver and Transmitter Units, moisture
 and fungus proofed, each including the following com-
 ponents:

SST-1G Receiver 2.4-16.3 megacycles
 SST-1D Transmitter
 SSP-1D Dual Power Unit for 6-volt DC or 90 to
 230 volts AC operation
 GN-45 Hand Generator
 Operational Spare Parts

4 each SSR-5A Radio Receivers, battery-operated, with opera-
 tional spare parts

2. This request has been informally coordinated between Major C. S.
 Perry of OSS and Major Leo H. Crosson of this Branch.

3. Delivery is requested as soon as equipment is available. Major
 Leo H. Crosson, REpublic 6700 Extension 4508 will receive the equipment
 from your warehouse, or other designated location, when it is available.

FOR THE CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE:

Russell H. Sweet
 RUSSELL H. SWEET
 Colonel, GSC
 Chief, Captured Personnel
 and Material Branch

**CONFIDENTIAL**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Cheston
 FROM : Major Willis
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 23 April 1945

Official MIS Request of April 10 for 14 SSTR-1 transmitters and receivers with spare parts, and 4 SSR-5A battery operated receivers.

On inquiry in regard to this matter, the most I have been able to find out to date is that Major Crosson who works in Colonel Hartman's office of MIS states that the request for the above items came to Colonel Hardman from Lt. Colonel Wichtrich of the AAS in Kunming and Chungking (AAS is Air-Ground Aid Service). This Service works with the 14th Air Force but is not part of them.

The sets are to be used by MIS Army personnel, but for what exact purpose they were unable to tell us.

There is a slight background to this. About two years ago, we gave 12 SSTR-1 sets to the same Lt. Colonel Wichtrich who has used them out in China since that time. The AAS have their own base stations and aid the 14th Air Force in the rescue of pilots forced down. Undoubtedly, of course, they do their own intelligence work, probably along the same lines as AGFTRS.

When asked why they could not use standard Army equipment instead of the SSTR-1, Major Crosson replied that the SSTR-1 set over the period they had used it had proved by far the best for their purposes.

It is my personal opinion that this request should be complied with by OSS.

To Eng. Wilson

SECRET

*Copy of this is
 sent to Eng. Wilson
 we shall comment
 on this matter
 the Colonel & are happy*

*able sent
 5/2/45*

OSS Form 108ub

DATE 26 April 1945TO: General Donovan

In connection with MIS request for 14 SSTR-1 radio receiver and transmitting units, you asked where they are to be used and for what purpose. Attached are Major Willis' answers to your questions.

Your instructions are requested.

EJP

FROM: Executive Office


(32816)

EXT. _____

To: Lt. Edward Wilson

Before anything is done about this
we should communicate with Heppner
and explain the situation and ask
his opinion.

W.J.D.


Director's Office

OSS Form 3054
(3308)

Form 66 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 2 MAY 1945

REC'D

1700 2 MAY 1945

TO SEE BELOW

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, COMMUNICATIONS,
FIELD SECTION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57879-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#11827. TO CHAFX, KUNMING (OUT 10303)
#8217. TO LAWOI, CHUJIKING (OUT 10304)

109 TO HEPPNER.

SECRET

REQUEST RECEIVED FROM LHS TO SUPPLY THEM WITH 16 SSR
ONES AND 4 SSR-5A RECEIVERS. LHS RECEIVED THIS REQUEST FROM
COLONEL WICHTRICH OF AGAS. INCLINED TO HONOR THIS REQUEST BUT BEFORE
DOING SO WISH YOUR OPINION. IF AVAILABLE IN FIELD YOU MAY PREFER
TO HANDLE THERE. ADVISE. IN ANY EVENT LHS COULD OBTAIN THIS EQUIPMENT
FROM OUR MANUFACTURERS THROUGH REGULAR ARMY CHANNELS BUT TO DO SO
WOULD INVOLVE ADDITIONAL DELAY.

2 MAY 1945

WJD/RT

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF

FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OSSS
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 4 MAY 45
FROM

TO CHAFX, KUNMING

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

FIELD SECTION,
SECRETARIAT, COMMUNICATIONS

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27483-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#8747. KUNMING TO WASHINGTON.

#5927. KUNMING TO CHUNGKING.

HEPPNER TO 109. RE YOUR #11827 (OUT-10303).

BELIEVE WE CAN TAKE CARE OF AGA'S REQUIREMENTS FROM THIS END
AND WOULD LIKE TO DEAL DIRECT WITH THEM HERE. WILL DISCUSS WITH THEM
AND ADVISE YOU RESULT.

SECRET

TOR: 1010 4 MAY 45

VC T
The one to follow thru
Willie to handle with me
Hepp
FILE COPY

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

9 May 1945

Colonel Russell H. Sweet
Chief, Captured Personnel and Material Branch
Military Intelligence Service
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Sweet:

This is to advise you that your request of 10 April 1945 for 14 each SSTR-1 radio receiver and transmitter units, moisture and fungus proof, including the various components mentioned in your letter, has been taken up directly by Colonel Heppner, our OSS Theater Officer in China, with Lt. Colonel Wiehtrich of AGAS.

Colonel Heppner has advised us that he believes he can take care of AGAS' requirements as specified in your letter of 10 April from out there in China, and he will take the matter up direct with them.

Upon receipt of your request, we believed that this matter might be most expeditiously handled in the field directly and with a very material saving in time if it was taken care of from our theater supply rather than from here. I trust this will be satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

Frederic A. Willis
Major, USMC
Acting Chief, Communications Branch

*We called them up by phone also -
Fred.*

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF
NEW DEVELOPMENTS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

10 April 1945

Office of Scientific Research
and Development
1530 P Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attn: Chief, Office of Field Service.

Dear Dr. Compton:

The New Developments Division has received a secret radiogram from the Southwest Pacific Area paraphrased as follows:

"To New Developments Division pass to Dr. Compton.

It is requested by the USAFFE Board technical data and information as to availability of small 10 watt radio transmitters-receivers believed to have been developed by the Office of Strategic Services. It is designated as SSTR 1, or also may be designated as 15K. These sets will fill an urgent need for operational use by special units. The weight of each unit is approximately 18 pounds and used a wet cell storage battery for power.

The exact frequency is not important. If sets are immediately available, 12 complete units are requested. The first 6 by air transportation and are desired by May 1st."

U-89433

In reply refer to ~~89433~~, 8 April 1945.

Lt Col B. Lillards

for Wm. A. Borden
Brigadier General, GSC
Director, New Developments Division

Cable and

SECRET



SECRET

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE

1530 P STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 14, 1946

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SPY ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 39. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENT IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Attention: General W. J. Donovan, Director

Subject : Request for Communications Equipment

Dear General Donovan:

The Office of Field Service has received a request from our Research Division located in the Southwest Pacific Area for small 10 watt radio transmitter receivers that we understand have been developed by the Office of Strategic Services and designated as SSTR 1 or as 15X. The exact frequency is not important.

We are informed that these sets when provided will fill a pressing need for operational use by special units. If this equipment is immediately available to us, 12 complete units are requested, and we wish to ship the first 6 by air transportation for delivery if possible by May 1.

We should greatly appreciate your cooperation in assisting us to meet this urgent request.

Sincerely yours,

for KARL T. COMPTON, Chief

by

A. K. Berle
Consultant

022

AKB:acc

MAY 14 4 09 PM '46

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

SECRET

Form 4001
(Rev. 11/21/54)

043 SECRETARIAT

TO -	NAME
	G. C. Boering, Jr.
	L. J. Montan
	E. J. Duffell, Jr.
	R. Thru
	D. C. Lee
	J. W. Aurbincloss
	W. D. Kantack
	W. H. Miley
	P. F. Ingliene
	A. W. Salloway
	J. B. Donovan
	A. W. Asmyth, Jr.
	A. L. Dart
	H. H. Hamilton
	L. R. Houston
	C. S. McLelland
	J. L. McDonnell
	J. R. Schooner, Jr.
	Secretariat Files
	Director's Files
	O. G. C. Files

*Pls hold for reply
upon receipt of cable
reply from WSD*

(23695)

OAS
Form 68 (Revised)**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

24 APRIL 45

REC'D

1643 24 APR 45

TO

CG, SWPA, LEYTE, P. I.

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, F. SEC.,
COMMUNICATIONS

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57082-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

TO CG, SWPA FROM THE DIRECTOR, OSS.

PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO FILL YOUR REQUEST FOR 12 RADIO SETS, SSTR-1 COMPLETE, WHICH YOU ASKED FOR IN YOUR U-89435 OF APRIL 8TH, RECEIVED THROUGH FIELD SERVICE OSRD. THESE SETS ARE BEING PRODUCED ON A LIMITED SCALE ONLY AND HAVE BECOME A HIGH PRIORITY REQUIREMENT FOR OSS ACTIVITIES IN ALL THE FAR EAST THEATERS, BUT WE DO REALIZE HOW URGENT IS YOUR NEED FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO DELIVER TO OSRD BY THE 25TH OF THIS MONTH FOR SHIPMENT TO YOUR STATION.

TOD: 1815 24 APR 45

CSC:RT

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT**SECRET**

OSS
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

FROM

30 APRIL 45

TO

CG US ARMY FORCES IN FAR EAST, MANILA, P. I.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARIAT, FIELD
SECTION

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET "141"

SECRET

TO: WAR DEPARTMENT
CG HAMILTON FIELD, SAN RAFAEL, CALIFORNIA
CG ATC GRAVELLY POINT, VIRGINIA/JX 23432, ACWAR, PAGE TO DR. COMPTON; INFORMATION: ATC, WASHINGTON,
HAMPAC, FROM CG USAFFE, SIGNED MACARTHUR.IN REFERENCE TO OUR JX 89433, DATED 4/7/45 AND A-72525
(OUT-9602) DATED 4/25/45 FROM OSS, PLEASE DISPATCH, UNDER AFR US-5W-
C-999-ASF-MAY, G RAD. SETS SSTR-1 COMPLETE. WEIGHT PER UNIT, 19 LBS.
CUBAGE PER UNIT, 1 CUB C FOOT. REMAINDER TO BE DISPATCHED BY EARLY
S.A. TRANSPORT CN. NOT SHIPMENTS TO APO 501 FOR RESEARCH SECTION
COAFD, USAFFE.

NOTE: JX 89433 IS CM-IN-7152 (8 APR 45) NDD

ACTION: OSS
INFORMATION: NDD; ASF; CG AAF
CV-IN-26701 (30 APR 45) DTG 30 1121Z

TOR: 0939 1 MAY 45

FILE COPY

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Office of Scientific Research and Development

SUBJECT: Receipt of Classified Material

TO: Gen. W. J. Donovan, Director, OSS

FROM: A. K. Berle, Consultant, OPR, 1680 P Street, Washington, D. C.

Transmitted ☒ a. Herewith☐ b. Under separate cover is the following material:

Description* Indicate whether material is letter, report, etc., typed, and reference or file number to identify it.	Date Received
1 so letter from AXB to WJD dated 4/14/45	4/14/45

Please sign and return this receipt immediately. The copy may be retained by you.

I have personally received the material described above and accept full responsibility for its safe-
 handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere in accordance with existing regulations of OSRD, the War
 Department, or the Navy Department whichever is pertinent.

Signed [Signature] Date: 12 April

*This section should be complete and must not contain Classified Information.
 *Type: CC-Signed original, CC-Carbon copy, PC-Photostat, TC-Typed copy.

Form 01-1
Rev. 3-21-44

D-0879

COPY

25 April 1946

SECRET

Office of Scientific Research & Development
1530 P Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Barle

Gentlemen:

Reference is made to your request placed upon the Director's Office for twelve (12) radio sets 83TR-1, complete.

The subject equipment has been approved by the Director's Office and is now being made ready for shipment in accordance with instructions to be supplied by your office. This material will be held until such time as you advise us of proper disposition.

For your information inclosed herewith is a paraphrase of the cable forwarded by the Director to the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific.

Very truly yours,

Charles S. Perry, Major Sig. C.
Chief, Supply & Warehousing Div.
Communications Branch

Attachment (1)

SECRET

Office of Scientific Research and Development

SUBJECT: Receipt of Classified Material

TO: Office of Strategic Services, 25th and E. Sts N.W., Wash., D.C.

FROM: A.K. Berle, Office of Field Service, 1530 P St. N.W., Wash., D.C.

Transmitted ☒ a. Herewith☐ b. Under separate cover is the following material:

Description* Indicate whether material is letter, report, etc., typed, and reference or file number to identify it.	Date Received
Letter to Major C. S. Perry's attention from A.K. Berle, Office of Field Service	5-7-45

Please sign and return this receipt immediately. The copy may be retained by you.

I have personally received the material described above and accept full responsibility for its safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere in accordance with existing regulations of OSRD, the War Department, or the Navy Department whichever is applicable.

Signed Paul S/B Date: _____

*The description should be complete and must not contain Classified information.
 type: SC-Signed original, CC-Carbon copy, PC-Photostat, TC-Typed copy.

Form OA-1
Rev. 3-31-44

2-2276



SECRET

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE
1510 P STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 7, 1946

Office of Strategic Services
25th and E. Streets N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attn: Major C. S. Perry, South Building

Gentlemen:

In reply please refer to
OFS - SWPA #26 -- 0
12 Radio Sets SSTR-1
AKB

We wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 29 April (October by typographical-error) informing us of the Director's approval of shipment of this equipment. We thank you very much.

This will confirm information stated to your Lt. Kerley who telephoned the writer for it. The destination address is:

Commanding General USAFFE Board
Research Section
HQ USAFFE (Advanced Echelon)
Attn. Dr. H.K. Stephenson, Chief Research Section

As you know CM-IN 28701 radio of 30 April provides theater authority to ship 6 sets by air and 6 sets by water. Though the radio was in error as to weight we understand from Col. Kent Lane, New Developments Division, that he has arranged with ATC for the air shipment and with POE for the water shipment and has informed your office as to shipping instructions, markings, etc.

This letter is intended merely as a record of the foregoing. Will you kindly inform us as to actual shipments and markings used so that we can post our West Coast shipping office for follow-up if necessary to expedite on the coast.

Your cooperation on these matters is very much appreciated.

Yours very truly,

A.K. Berle
A.K. BERLE, Consultant

AKB:lrs

cc: NDD, Col. Kent Lane
OSS (2)

SECRET

[illegible]

OSRD

WTA 23504

PT0000-2

Major Perry, Reqs. #5265

1. 6 Transceivers, SETR-1, includes SST-1 Transmitter, SSR-1 (but not SI-2) Receiver and SSP-1 power supply, and spare parts.
Card 1-483

SECRET

9 May 1945

Office of Scientific Research & Development
Office of Field Service
1630 P Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attn: Mr. A. K. Berle, Consultant

Subject: OFS - SWPA #26 --)
12 Radio Sets SSTR-1
AKB

Gentlemen:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 7 May 1945. To comply with your request contained in the last paragraph I am enclosing herewith a copy of the War Department Shipping Document covering the air and sea shipment of the subject equipment.

The pink copy attached signifies that the air shipment has moved and addressed in accordance with the information contained therein. The yellow copy attached covers the sea shipment which has not yet physically moved from our warehouse to date. When this shipment actually moves a pink copy of the War Department Shipping Document will be forwarded to you to signify that this shipment has now moved to the POE and at that time all markings will be shown on the War Department Shipping Document.

Very truly yours,

Enc. (2)
cc: Col. L. W. Lowman
CSF:mb

Charles S. Perry, Major Sig. C.
Chief, Supply & Warehousing Div.
Communications Branch

SECRET

OSS Form 4151

SECRETDate 5/9To: Major Willis

Per our conversation, you will notify MIS of our decision contained in cable IN-12148 from Kunming, dated 4 May 1945.

Please attach to the file annexed hereto appropriate notations of communications both with MIS and with OSRD in connection with their respective requests, and return to the Director's files.

✓
E.J. Putzell*notations attached***SECRET**

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)



SECRET

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF FIELD SERVICE

1530 P STREET NW,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 17, 1945

The Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

Subject: Shipment of 12 Transceivers SSER - 1
OFS - SWPA # 23 - - c

Dear Sir:

You have notified this office of shipment of 12 radio sets SSER - 1 in response to our request by letter of 14 April.

We want you to know that we greatly appreciate your full cooperation in this matter and wish to express our thanks to you.

Yours very truly,

KARL T. COMPTON, Chief

A. K. Berle
By A. K. Berle, Consultant
Office of Field Service

AKB:mep

cc: Major G. S. Perry

022

MAY 18 10 34 AM '45

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

To improve the present one man courier service, it might be possible to arrange definite scheduled 15 minute trips from the basement to the Secretariat, or if desired, a call box could be wired so that upon pressing a button in the Message Center a light would show on the courier's desk in Secretariat indicating that Message Center had some traffic for him.

It might be feasible to have a courier assigned to Message Center to stay in the basement hallway and make trips every few minutes to the Secretariat. In addition if that did not give him sufficient work to justify his assignment, he might also be responsible for delivering cables to General Magruder's office in Central Building. One such courier could probably make a trip to Secretariat and to General Magruder every fifteen minutes and give satisfactory service from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM. This would be an improvement over the present haphazard courier system and might satisfy Lt. Putzell's requirements.

SUMMARY

The Lamson Corporation representative did not think that a pneumatic tube would be practicable for the small number of papers to be carried, although it could be installed.

A dumb-waiter would require a shaft through the first and second floors of the building necessitating a considerable construction project. A shaft outside of the building would present certain problems in security and weatherproofing and would not terminate in the proper places.

Any tube or shaft installation is a fixed piece of equipment. Should there be a change in the allocation of space in Administration Building, it would be a difficult and expensive job to move the carrier.

* Improved courier service would seem to be the most flexible method, although it would be slower than any automatic carrier system.

Charles D. Jennings
CHARLES D. JENNINGS
2d Lt, Sig C

CONFIDENTIAL

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floor, the tube would have to make an inverted "U" loop. This would require a slightly longer pipe.

A blower and motor would be needed. This should be a 1/2 horsepower unit - fairly small - which could be mounted in the basement hallway. There is little noise in the operation of the blower. A switch would be wired into the tube opening in such a manner that the blower would work only when a carrier was placed in the tube and would automatically stop a few minutes later.

The cost of a similar Lamson installation at Mount Vernon was \$750.00. Pneumatic tube equipment can be obtained under an AA-1 or higher priority.

Mr. Brinley's frank opinion was that a tube of such short length, if it did not carry a very large volume of traffic, would be impracticable.

DUMB-WAITER INSTALLATION

A vertical lift could be installed from Message Center to Room 123. This would require that holes be cut through both floors large enough to contain a cage approximately two feet square. The shaft must be completely enclosed by wood or metal and would contain a small elevator - - hand powered by ropes - - with a suitable container for messages. A buzzer could be installed to signal the Registry when a basket of traffic was sent up.

Mr. Brinley advised that the Lamson Corporation built this sort of device before the war, but no longer engaged in that type of work. The Kelly Cash and Package Carrier Company of Chicago (no Washington representative) might have the necessary equipment if a commercially manufactured unit were desired.

It would be possible for the Public Buildings workmen and the Message Center Mechanics to construct and install such a carrier. The cost should not exceed \$500.00. This is my own estimate.

Such a carrier would probably pass through Colonel Deering's office or through the entrance hallway on the first floor of Administration.

If it is seriously intended that such a system be employed, I shall ask the building people to draw up the necessary specifications of the carrier. There may be some objection to making holes of the size required in the building floors.

COURIER SERVICE

Lt. Putzell states that the Secretariat courier is unable to carry traffic upstairs every few minutes because he is kept busy on many other trips around the OSS offices.

An additional courier could be employed to assist in this work. The cost of an Army private runs around \$600 per year plus rations and quarters allowances of \$1100 a year. I do not know what the organization pays civilian couriers, but imagine it runs around the same figure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Major FREDERIC A. WILLIS

DATE: 24 October 44

FROM: Lt. C. B. JENNINGS

SUBJECT: CARRIER SERVICE FROM MESSAGE CENTER TO SECRETARIAT

As you requested, I approached Lt. Putsell of the Executive office to obtain his views on the proposed pneumatic tube or dumb-waiter system between the Message Center and the Director's Registry. He is anxious that some sort of high speed carrier system be installed. He did not seem to care what sort of system was introduced provided that it materially speeded up the delivery of cables to the Director. When I mentioned that a pneumatic tube might cost \$1,000, he pointed out that the war may last for two years and that \$1,000 is not very much money to spend if the benefits are to be derived for that length of time.

LOCATIONS OF TERMINAL POINTS

The north-east corner of Room 4 (the Message Center front office) is almost directly below Mrs. Jenks' office in Room 223. If any conveyor were installed on a straight vertical line between those two points, however, it would have to pass through a corner of Col. Doering's office. That might prove to be objectionable. Mrs. Jenks is not particular about the exact location of the terminal in her office, and will revise her room arrangement to suit whatever device is installed. For Message Center purposes, it would be advantageous to have the terminal as near to the receptionist's desk in Room 4 as possible.

CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS

Regardless of what type of carrier is installed, holes must be drilled through the first and second floors of the building, and if a pneumatic tube is installed, holes must also be drilled through several brick walls. Mr. Colburn has indicated that the Building Superintendent will be willing to cooperate within any reasonable limit by giving permission to cut the necessary holes and install a suitable system.

PNEUMATIC TUBE INSTALLATION

Mr. C. C. Brinley of the Lamson Corporation examined the prospect of pneumatic tubes and furnished the following information.

A tube could be installed between the two rooms. He suggests carriers approximately 3 inches in diameter and at least 8 inches long so that messages could be inserted in them without being folded. A completely vertical tube is not satisfactory from an operating standpoint. It would be necessary to have the tube run a short distance horizontal in the basement before bringing it upstairs. At the terminal point on the second

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055 FORM 1154-6

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Communications Branch

DATE _____

TO: Mr. Putzell

FROM: _____

Neither was Willet
or I have any
answers on these
Wright's problem

Suggest you decide
and tell Mr. Tamm

(23921)

[Signature]

Form 10
Rev. 11/72

000 SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

DATE

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	O. C. Boering, Jr.	
	J. J. Monigan	
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	E. Thrum	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. W. Anchinow	
	W. B. Kantack	
	W. H. Miley	
	P. F. Pugliese	
	A. W. Sullovy	
	J. H. Donovan	
	A. W. Asmuth, Jr.	
	A. L. Dart	
	H. H. Hamilton	
	L. R. Houston	
	C. S. McClelland	
	J. I. McDonnell	
	J. K. Schoener, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	O. G. C. Files	

* But a courier
would be infinitely
more expensive

(23695)

035 Form 4131

sp
for

Free when ready
Jordley

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Colonel Lowman
 SUBJECT: Russian Communications.

DATE: 1 May 1946

There are automatic machine Army radio facilities from Caserta to Algiers to Moscow, or from Washington to Algiers to Moscow. There is no direct contact from Washington to Moscow. Everything from either Washington or Caserta must go via Algiers to get to Moscow. RCA does not have commercial facilities from Rome to Moscow. RCA and Mackay in New York and the Cable and Wireless Co. in London both have commercial service to Moscow. There is no appreciable loss of time in the use of either Army or commercial facilities.

It would be our suggestion that someone in General Deane's party take our one-time pads to Moscow to give us a completely secure method of our own.

Because of the politics involved, it might be well to ~~also~~ file these by commercial facilities rather than over the Army channels.

Anyone in his party could learn how to use these one-time pads in a few minutes.

If you want to send someone especially over to write an occasional message, we have one man at OCS who will be finished in three or four weeks. He is bright, capable, and speaks some Russian. Major Delafield says he is somewhere between fair and good at it. We have an enlisted man in ETO in the same category, and another enlisted man in Caserta in approximately the same category. Again, I would like to point out that the actual work involved would be so little that the question of its being worthwhile unless the man were to do something else, would be important from a morale standpoint if from no other.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

For these reasons and those I submitted in my memorandum yesterday I think OSS should be alert to take a continuous and firm stand on this matter.

I must add that from a Communications Branch angle we would love to see a lot of material that no longer had to be encoded and decoded; but I consider this natural desire of no importance whatsoever, nor have I faith that if such a practice were evoked it would necessarily change the character or the quantity of our administrative messages.

F. W.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17410
Communications Branch
17410
17410
31 August 1945

To: Major General William J. Donovan
 From: Major Frederick Willis

In addition to the memorandum concerning the Theater post surrender policy on putting administrative cables in the clear, I think that this matter may from time to time come up in a fairly strong way, and be batted around for discussion.

Therefore, I would like to add one or two points to my recommendations of yesterday concerning this matter.

Our own OSS intelligence groups found very considerable value in the material gotten from the intercepts at the Reside Monitoring Station. These, as you know, were intercepts of clear Japanese messages.

If our intelligence groups could find great value in this material it is reasonable to expect that Japanese or puppet regimes hostile to the post war interests of America, could find an equal value in our administrative communications or cables if sent in the clear. And there is no reason to assume that they would not be monitoring.

The second point is, most of the news services like I.N.S., Press Wireless, A.P., etc. monitor a lot of "clear" transmission material. This means that if they should pick up some of our administrative traffic in the clear, and if they found a good story from a news angle, since it was in the clear they would feel no compunction about publishing it as they would consider it public property.

This lack of protection to a government intelligence agency, in my opinion, would be a most hazardous and unwise situation to permit. The implications and significance of such a practice are, I believe you will agree, all too obvious.

*Very little reported to
 the State Dept. file*

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